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Abstract. Research has not examined how the impacts of arrests manifest across space and time 19  
in environmental crimes. We evaluate whether arrests reduce or merely spatiotemporally 20  
displace intentional illegal outdoor firesetting. Using municipality-level daily wildfire count data 21  
from Galicia, Spain, from 1999 to 2014, we develop daily spatiotemporal ignition count models 22  
of agricultural, non-agricultural, and total intentional illegal wildfires as functions of 23  
spatiotemporally lagged arrests, the election cycle, seasonal and day indicators, meteorological 24  
factors, and socio-economic variables. We find evidence that arrests reduce future intentional 25  
illegal fires across space in subsequent time periods.   26  
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Brief Summary. We evaluate whether arrests of intentional illegal firesetters lead to movements 27  
in or reductions of future fires in nearby locations. Our analyses of daily wildfire count data from 28  
Galicia, Spain, 1999 to 2014, show that arrests lead to overall reductions in intentional illegal 29  
firesetting.   30  
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Introduction 31  
Natural resource managers worldwide face a challenge of how to limit the occurrence of 32  
accidentally and intentionally ignited wildfires that destroy property, damage resources, and 33  
harm people. A changing climate is projected to increase wildfire potential, severity, and extent 34  
(e.g., Krawchuk et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2010; Jolly et al. 2015), potentially exacerbating the 35  
damages and raising the urgency of addressing human-ignited wildfires (Balch et al. 2017; 36  
Bowman et al. 2017). Among the strategies and tactics available to policy makers in response to 37  
heightened wildfire risks is to boost law enforcement efforts (e.g., Donoghue and Main 1985; 38  
Butry and Prestemon 2005; Prestemon and Butry 2005; Prestemon and Butry 2010; Abt et al. 39  
2015) aimed at apprehending and deterring intentional firesetters1. With only a few exceptions 40  
(e.g., Thomas et al. 2011; Prestemon et al. 2012), research has not evaluated how and whether 41  
arrests, a discrete measure of law enforcement efforts, are linked to reductions in the occurrence 42  
of intentional fires or whether such efforts have broader impacts across space and time.  43  
The effects of law enforcement efforts are potentially complex, considering motivated 44  
offenders’ dynamic responses. Criminologists have long recognized that actions by law 45  
enforcement or other groups intended to reduce crime in one time or place or of one type might 46  
be at least partially offset by compensating shifts in behaviors of prospective offenders in 47  
response to those efforts (e.g., Cornish and Clarke 1987; Barr and Pease 1990; Eck 1993; Clarke 48  
and Weisburd 1994; Guerette 2009). While spatiotemporal concentrations in arson are evident in 49  
maps of wildfires (e.g., Mothershead 2012), no study has sought to characterize the effects of 50  
                                                                                                            
1 In this study, we define all intentional firesetting as illegal and so refer to intentional illegal 
firesetting as ‘intentional firesetting.’ 
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arrests on these fires at fine spatial scales or over longer time scales than detected by Prestemon 51  
et al. (2012). Understanding how law enforcement efforts affect the timing and locations of 52  
future offending, including illegal firesetting, is critical to enacting effective policies and in the 53  
design of more effective law enforcement strategies (e.g., Weisburd and Eck 2004) aimed at 54  
reducing the occurrence of unwanted wildfires. 55  
The primary objective of our study is to assess whether there is evidence of 56  
spatiotemporal displacement effects of law enforcement in intentional outdoor firesetting. To do 57  
this, we develop statistical models that control for hypothesized driving factors in addition to 58  
arrests. Among the driving factors we include are variables describing the seasonality of 59  
intentional firesetting, which likely stems from regular variations in fuel flammability and 60  
ignition attempts related to agricultural or other seasonal activities (e.g., hunting) and daily 61  
human routines (days of the week and holidays). Additionally, we include variables explaining 62  
firesetting variation at longer time scales, which capture associations with slowly changing 63  
aggregate wildland fuels and demographic and economic conditions. Finally, we include a set of 64  
indicators of election seasons, which have been shown in other research to be criminogenic for 65  
firesetting in Europe (e.g., Seijo 2005; Álvarez-Díaz et al. 2015; Ramos and Sanz 2018).2 With 66  
the inclusion of election season indicators, we are able to quantify the daily time scale imprint of 67  
one form of politically based protest actions (Pyne 1995), extending existing research and 68  
                                                                                                            
2  Mechanisms proposed or identified for how electoral cycles could influence intentional 
firesetting include election-related adjustments in law enforcement effectiveness—law 
enforcement budgets (Efthyvoulou 2012) and police force levels (Levitt 1997)—and the scope or 
severity of criminal sanctions (Smith 2004; Dyke 2007; Berdejó and Yuchtman 2013).   
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providing additional policy relevant insights. Their inclusion also helps to explain variation in 69  
observed intentional wildfires, increasing the power of our statistical inferences regarding law 70  
enforcement spatiotemporal effects. 71  
This study advances the earlier work by Prestemon et al. (2012) by including 72  
spatiotemporal lags of arrests in the equation specifications. While those authors allowed for 73  
effects of arrests at long temporal scales, their models did not include arrests lagged as long as 74  
done in this study. Furthermore, their models were not specified in a way that quantified how 75  
intentional fires in one location could be associated with arrests in nearby locations in previous 76  
time periods. Finally, Prestemon et al. (2012) ignored the potentially differing firesetting 77  
processes across reported motivations, which we find are distinct in their responses to arrests, a 78  
potentially important distinction with implications for law enforcement resource allocation 79  
decisions. The study also advances research into the role of elections on wildfires in Spain 80  
conducted by Álvarez-Díaz et al. (2015), who used reduced-form vector error correction 81  
modeling methods to identify the association between the national total numbers of forest fires 82  
during “intense” electoral years. Our study, in contrast, estimates count data structural equations 83  
of intentional wildfires in Spain, controlling for the many factors that influence wildfire ignition 84  
processes, including the motivations of firesetters, arrests, and elections. Our equations are 85  
estimated at fine temporal (daily) and spatial (municipality) scales, measuring how specific 86  
phases of elections affect the daily pattern of firesetting in the run-up to elections. 87  
 88  
Theory and methods 89  
Theory of intentional firesetting 90  
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Cohen and Felson (1979) describe a Routine Activities (RA) theory of crime which forms the 91  
foundation upon which we build our empirical model of the numbers of intentional wildfires. 92  
These authors contend that criminal activities vary over time and space according to variations in 93  
the simultaneous overlap of three essential elements of crime occurrence: (1) a motivated 94  
offender, (2) a suitable target, and (3) the absence of capable guardians against a violation; if one 95  
of these elements is missing, then a crime will not occur. It is straightforward to design an 96  
empirical modeling framework around RA theory because motivated offenders and suitable 97  
targets are simple to define.  98  
Geographers, philosophers, and criminologists dating back several centuries have 99  
recognized that persistent criminal activity has evident spatial components related to societal and 100  
landscape features (see Cohen [1941] and Cohen and Felson [1979] for informative syntheses). 101  
As Cohen and Felson (1979) argue, defining RA theory, persistent spatial and temporal 102  
concentrations of offending may be attributed to fine and coarse scale spatial and temporal 103  
(hourly, daily, seasonal) features of landscapes and routine human behaviors as well as to 104  
temporally trending variations in the relative abundances of motivated offenders, suitable targets, 105  
and capable guardians. Here, we propose that RA theory is an amenable framework for 106  
understanding these observed spatial and temporal patterns. In the development of an empirical 107  
version of a Routine Activities theory of intentional firesetting, we identify candidate physical, 108  
biological, and societal variables that vary over space and time that can be mapped to one (or 109  
more) of the three elements of RA theory. With this empirical framework, we are able to test for 110  
spatiotemporal displacement and uncover the effects of other policy relevant phenomena on 111  
intentional firesetting.  112  
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We summarize the variables connected to each of these three elements of RA theory as it 113  
relates to intentional firesetting: 114  
 115  
 Motivated offenders: Variations in the numbers of motivated firesetters in a location is 116  
likely related to several demographic, social, and economic factors, including the size of 117  
the human population, historical efforts to remove known offenders from the location, 118  
and factors that influence motivations to offend. Such motivational factors can be broadly 119  
defined as incentives to commit a crime (e.g., utility gained or pecuniary benefits 120  
acquired). In the case of intentional wildland firesetting, greater incentives might exist 121  
during times of political discord (Dyke 2007), when firesetters protest by igniting 122  
wildfires (e.g., Pyne 1995; Kull 2002; Seijo 2005, 2009; Hovardas 2014, 2015; Skouras 123  
and Christodoulakis 2014; Álvarez-Díaz et al. 2015; Ramos and Sanz 2018); when 124  
agricultural areas may be prepared for planting by (illegally) burning them; and when the 125  
opportunity costs of time for firesetters are low (e.g., in times and places where they are 126  
unemployed) (e.g., Prestemon and Butry 2005; Sebastián-López et al. 2008), which 127  
reduces the pecuniary cost of spending time trying to ignite fires and the expected costs 128  
of being arrested and imprisoned for igniting a fire.  129  
 130  
Suitable targets: Variations in suitable targets for intentional wildfires can be explained 131  
by variations in the availability of flammable wildland fuels and in the weather suitable 132  
for successful ignition and spread.  133  
 134  
  9  
  
Capable guardians: Variations over time and space in capable guardians could be indexed 135  
by law enforcement efforts; the number of patrol officers or the effectiveness of law 136  
enforcement actions (e.g., arrests) could vary over space and time. Measures of political 137  
discord, which can induce reallocations of law enforcement resources across space and 138  
time, could further proxy for short-run changes in capable guardianship. 139  
 140  
Our introduction of arrests into a Routine Activities-based theory of intentional 141  
firesetting bears further exploration. Because offenders who are caught are often sanctioned by 142  
imprisonment, an arrest actually affects two elements of RA theory. First, the arrest can shrink 143  
the pool of motivated offenders by removing spatially stationary serial criminals from the 144  
landscape (e.g., Canela-Cacho et al. 1997; Ratcliffe and Rengert 2008). Second, an arrest, if 145  
observed widely across space, potentially raises the perceived strength of capable guardianship.3 146  
Guardianship adjustments may be more likely to occur close to the location of the arrest (e.g., 147  
Levitt 1998; Pogarsky et al. 2004), we hypothesize, because arrest information may be more 148  
readily communicated locally to motivated offenders, achieving a local crime reduction 149  
subsequent to the arrest. If the arrest information is more broadly disseminated across space, then 150  
this adjustment could result in a deterrent effect across a larger spatial domain, revealed, in the 151  
case of intentional firesetting, as a reduction in the number of fires in subsequent time periods in 152  
                                                                                                            
3 Another way to view “motivation” is in terms of the prospective offender’s expected net 
psychic or monetary benefits of crime commission, in the form advanced by Becker (1968). 
Hence, an increased probability of arrest would be expected to lower the expected net benefits of 
crime commission.  
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surrounding locations. The motivated offender may also be induced by an arrest to change their 153  
“domestic base” of operation in order to avoid localities where capable guardianship has 154  
increased (e.g., Telep et al. 2014). The result of this dynamic response by motivated offenders 155  
may be higher overall crime rates farther from the arrest location in subsequent time periods, 156  
revealing how law enforcement actions could displace crime in space-time (e.g., Eck 1993; 157  
Bowers and Johnson 2003; Guerette and Bowers 2009; Bowers et al. 2011). Displacement 158  
caused by an arrest would be revealed by, ceteris paribus, higher numbers of intentional fires in 159  
subsequent time periods in areas more distant from the arrest location.  160  
Application of RA theory to intentional firesetting should comprehend existing evidence 161  
of positive temporal autocorrelation in intentional firesetting (e.g., Butry and Prestemon 2005; 162  
Prestemon et al. 2012). The cited studies attribute positive autocorrelation to a combination of 163  
serial and copycat firesetting. Kocsis and Irwin (1997) find that serial arsonists (along with 164  
rapists and burglars) tend to commit their crimes close to their domestic base but also exhibit an 165  
occasional “commuter pattern,” ranging farther from the domestic base to carry out some of their 166  
offending. Such spatiotemporal clustering of firesetting is consistent with the near-repeat 167  
hypothesis in crime victimization tested by many analysts of certain property crimes (e.g., 168  
Townsley et al. 2003; Bowers and Johnson 2005; Bernasco 2008; Ratcliffe and Rengert 2008; 169  
Bernasco et al. 2015) and identified as well for non-wildland arson (Prestemon et al. 2013; 170  
Grubb and Nobles 2016).  171  
 172  
Empirical specifications 173  
The study location chosen is the region of Galicia, Spain, where intentional wildfires are the 174  
dominant cause attribution (APAS 2005). Galicia is also a region with a large enough number of 175  
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intentional wildfires (half of Spain’s) and associated arrests to permit statistical identification of 176  
spatiotemporal effects of arrests.  177  
Accurate quantification of the spatiotemporal displacement of intentional firesetting due 178  
to arrests might depend on the type of motivated offender that is being modeled. Therefore, we 179  
test for the spatiotemporal effects of arrests and the effects of elections and other driving 180  
variables by partitioning our data according to whether a fire is classified as agriculturally or 181  
non-agriculturally motivated. Separate evaluation of these two broad categories of intentional 182  
firesetting could reveal the potential biases of modeling that ignores their different nature and 183  
uncover their distinct spatiotemporal dynamics. Also, separate modeling by motivation could 184  
potentially yield more accurate assessments of the overall effects of changes in law enforcement 185  
efforts and elections on firesetting in the region and reveal how prevention efforts might be 186  
differently focused on these two categories of intentional fires.  187  
 More formally, express the probability of I intentional wildfires started for motivation m 188  
in location j in period t as a function of a vector of variables affecting the number of motivated 189  
offenders in period t (Yt), a vector of variables measuring the availability of suitable targets in 190  
period t (Wt), and vectors of measures (A) of the presence of (effective) capable guardians in 191  
location j and nearby locations k over l lagged time periods as: 192  
 193   Pr  (𝐼!,!!) = 𝑓(𝐘!,! ,𝐖!,! ,𝐀!,! ,𝐀!,!)        (1) 194  
 195  
Vector Yj,t, the number of motivated offenders in our study, is comprised of the human 196  
population in the location (Pj,t); income earning (Gj,t) potential for residents of location j; the 197  
unemployment rate (Uj,t); dummies measuring holidays (Ht) and each of two weekend days 198  
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(𝐑! = (𝑅!!"# ,𝑅!!"#)), when the opportunity costs of firesetting are lower (and motivations 199  
higher) (Gill et al. 1987; Prestemon and Butry 2005; Prestemon et al. 2012); and a subvector of 200  
variables describing the occurrence of an election (Ej,t), 𝐄!,! = (𝐸!,!! ,𝐸!,!!!"! ,𝐸!,!!!"! ,𝐸!,!!!"! ,𝐸!,!! ,𝐸!,!! ), 201  
where  𝐸!,!!  is a dummy variable =1 during the next 15 days (also called campaign days) in 202  
advance of an election, 0 otherwise; 𝐸!,!!  is a dummy variable =1 during the single silence day 203  
prior to an election, 0 otherwise; and 𝐸!,!!  is =1 for the single day of the election. Note that the 204  
t+15, t+30, and t+45 leads of the election campaign days dummy variable are intended to capture 205  
the potentially long criminogenic temporal footprint of elections. Also, note that the last lead 206  
only occurs to lead 52 days, which covers only the last week of the 52-day statutorily required 207  
number of days from the announcement of an election and the election’s actual occurrence. The 208  
motivated offender vector is therefore 𝐘!,! = (𝑃!,! ,𝐺!,! ,𝑈! ,𝐻! ,𝐑! ,𝐄!,!). 209  
 The vector Wj,t, the number of suitable targets in location j in period t,  described as a 210  
function of available flammable fuels, which can be quantified by a vector of meteorological 211  
variables (𝐙!,!), consisting of minimum daily relative humidity (𝑍!,!! ), total daily precipitation 212  
(𝑍!,!! ),  the Keetch-Byram Drought Index (Keetch and Byram 1968) (𝑍!,!! ), the Fire Weather Index 213  
(Fosberg 1978) (𝑍!,!! ), daily maximum hourly wind speed (𝑍!,!! ), and maximum daily temperature 214  
(𝑍!,!! ) (e.g., Prestemon et al. 2012), so that 𝐙!,! = (𝑍!,!! ,𝑍!,!! ,𝑍!,!! ,𝑍!,!! ,𝑍!,!! 𝑍!,!! ). It also includes 215  
seasonal variation in firesetting (e.g., Fuller 1996), as a set of 11 month dummy variables, 216   𝐃𝐌! = (𝐷𝑀!!"#,𝐷𝑀!!"# ,… ,𝐷𝑀!!"#), with the effect of December included in the intercept. The 217  
suitable targets vector is 𝐖!,! = (𝐙!,! ,𝐃𝐌𝑡). 218  
 Finally, vectors of variables indexing capable guardianship in location j in period t are 219  
measured by successive lags of arrests for intentional firesetting (of either motivation, since we 220  
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lack specific information about the motivations of arrestees). We include running sums of the 221  
count of arrests lagged t-1 to t-365 and t-366 to t-545 in location j, so that 222   𝐀!,!!! = ( 𝐴!,!!!!"#!!! , 𝐴!,!!!!"!!!!"" ). Recognizing the recommendations about choice of buffer 223  
distances (Phillips 2011), we use a proportionate size criterion, with buffer radii at 10, 15, and 25 224  
kilometers. These radii are also justified by observed firesetting behavior by serial arsonists in 225  
Spain (Sotoca Plaza 2016). Variables on the neighboring arrests were also generated using 226  
running sums, these occurring in three successively more distant “donuts” around the 227  
municipality: 10, 15, and 25 km, with vector 𝐀!,!!! = (𝐀!,!!!",𝐀!,!!"!",𝐀!,!!"!"), 228   𝐀!,!!!" = ( 𝐴!,!!!!!"!"#!!! , 𝐴!,!!!!!"!"!!!!"" ), 𝐀!,!!"!" = ( 𝐴!,!!!!"!"!"#!!! , 𝐴!,!!!!"!"!"!!!!"" ),  𝐀!,!!"!" = ( 𝐴!,!!!!"!"!"#!!! , 𝐴!,!!!!"!"!"!!!!"" ).  229  
The number of intentional wildfires is hypothesized to follow a count process, distributed 230  
as Poisson but with a variance σ2 that is a function of its expected value (µj) and a scale 231  
parameter, α, i.e., a negative binomial model (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, p. 70), 𝜎! = 𝜇! +232   𝛼𝜇!!. Adding the time subscript (t), indicating the motivation m, and consolidating the 233  
independent variables shown in (1) into a single vector (Xj,t) and a conforming vector of 234  
parameters (βm), we have: 235  
 236   𝜇!,!! = exp  (𝐗!,!! 𝛃!)          (2) 237  
 238  
Equation (2) assumes that all spatial units have independently and identically distributed 239  
errors, a situation not likely to be met. Therefore, a fixed effects process is considered, allowing 240  
for variations across municipalities in the average rates of intentional wildfires due to time 241  
invariant unobservable factors. Therefore, equation (2) is augmented to include indicator 242  
parameters representing locations, a j-dimensional vector Dm:  243  
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 244   𝜇!,!! = exp  (𝐗!,!! 𝛃! + 𝐃!!)         (3) 245  
 246  
The likelihood function for equation (3) is 247  
 248  
ln 𝐿 𝛼! ,𝛃! ,𝐃! = ln 𝑡 + 𝛼!!!!!!! − ln 𝐼!,!!! − 𝐼!,!! + 𝛼!!! ln  (1 + 𝛼! exp 𝐗!,!! 𝛃! + 𝐷!!)) + 𝐼!,!! ln𝛼! + 𝐼!,!!(𝐗!,!! 𝛃! + 𝐷!!)!!!!  249  
   (4) 250  
 251  
A random effects version of this same general model for cross-sectional data is also available, 252  
but in the interest of brevity, we do not show its specification or likelihood equation. 253  
To account for temporal autoregressivity in intentional wildfires, we adopt a method 254  
recommended by Zeger and Qaqish (1988) and elaborated in Cameron and Trivedi (1998, p. 255  
239-240). Their approach entails specifying two variables constructed from lags of the dependent 256  
variable: 257  
 258   𝐼!,!!!!∗∗ = 𝐼!,!!!!   and  d!,!! = 0, 𝐼!,!!!! > 0,𝐼!,!!!!∗∗ = 1  and  d!,!! = 1, 𝐼!,!!!! = 0        (5) 259  
 260  
Lags of the variables specified in (5) accommodate higher orders of autoregression in the count 261  
process. In estimation, 𝐗!,!! 𝛃! can be augmented to include r-dimensional subvectors 𝐈!!!!∗∗ and 262   𝐝!!!!!! , where r is the order of autoregression. Coefficients on the elements of 𝐈!!!!∗∗ are estimates 263  
of autoregressive components, and those in 𝐝!!!!!!  rescale the effect of the lagged dependent 264  
variable in cases in which 𝐼!,!!!! = 0.  265  
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The presence of significant autoregression in the dependent variable implies that there are 266  
short-run and long-run effects of a change in the elements of X besides  𝐈!!!!∗∗ and 𝐝!!!!!! . The 267  
long-run effect of any non-autoregressive variable i in X on 𝐼!  is calculated as 𝛽!!,!" =268   𝛽!!/(1− 𝛽!!!!!! ), where 𝛽!! is the estimated autoregressive component u (u=1,…, r), 269  
quantified as the coefficient of 𝐼!!!!∗∗  from the estimate of (3) or (4), augmented by 𝐈!!!!∗∗ and 270   𝐝!!!!!! . 271  
Following Leamer (1983), and with examples of the importance of his recommendations 272  
(e.g., Levine and Renelt 1992), it has now become standard practice in many economics journals 273  
to test inferences across multiple specifications in order to evaluate whether these inferences are 274  
robust to specification. We follow this practice by testing for the effects of arrests, elections, and 275  
other hypothesized variables using several specifications that carry with them different 276  
assumptions about the intentional wildfire data generation process. In addition to a fixed effects 277  
negative binomial and a random effects negative binomial, we model intentional wildfires using 278  
four alternative estimators, which each make differing assumptions about the intentional wildfire 279  
data generating process. These include (i) a pooled (across municipalities) negative binomial 280  
model that controls for municipality-level differences in error variance, (ii) a pooled negative 281  
binomial (NB) model with municipality indicators that also controls for municipality-level 282  
differences in error variance, and two specifications that recognize potential zero-inflation in the 283  
count of intentional wildfires: (iii) a pooled zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model that 284  
controls for municipality-level differences in error variance, and (iv) a pooled ZINB with 285  
municipality indicators that also controls for municipality-level differences in error variance.  286  
Evaluation of the magnitudes of the effects of the variables of interest—arrests and 287  
elections—were done with a counterfactual analysis. In the case of arrests, we can quantify the 288  
  16  
  
long-run average effects of an arrest by, say, simulating an increase the number of arrests by 1% 289  
and observing how the predicted counts of intentional wildfires changes, or 290   𝜏!,! = (𝐼!,!!,!"#!!"#∗ − 𝐼!,!!,!"#!!"#)!!!!!!!! . Arrest effects are measured with an elasticity. To 291  
evaluate the nonmarginal effects of elections, we compare the predicted counts of intentional 292  
wildfires with the counts predicted with all election dummy variables set to zero, 𝜏!,! =293   (𝐼!,!!,!"#!! − 𝐼!,!!,!"#!!"#)!!!!!!!! . Election effects measured as changes in total numbers and 294  
percent. 295  
Given that our data are spatially arranged, maximum likelihood estimation of any of our 296  
model specifications could produce spatially autocorrelated residuals deriving from omitted 297  
spatially correlated factors (e.g., Dormann et al. 2007), which would have the effect of 298  
attenuating standard errors. While more complex methods of bounding of our model coefficient 299  
estimates do exist (e.g., Hall 1985; Liu and Singh 1992), and these could be tried in future 300  
studies to uncover any residual spatial autocorrelation remaining, Monte Carlo bootstrapped 301  
generation of the effects size confidence limits provides a view of the statistical significances of 302  
the overall effects of arrests and elections, regardless of any possible standard error attenuation 303  
in model estimates.  304  
 305  
Data and estimation 306  
We assembled data on total daily counts of reported ignitions of agricultural (𝐼!,!!!!"#$%&'(&#!') 307  
and non-agricultural intentional wildfires (𝐼!,!!!!"!!!"#$%&'(&#!') in Galicia, covering a 16-year 308  
period between 1 January 1999, and 31 December 2014. The spatial unit of observation is the 309  
municipality (Figure 1), of which there are 313. The wildfire database (General Statistics of 310  
Forest Fires compiled by the Spanish Forest Service) contains observations on 108,527 fires over 311  
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the 16-year span, burning 431,956 ha. Data on each wildfire include a general cause attribution 312  
(lightning, negligence and accidents, intentional, reignition, and unknown), the majority of which 313  
(81%) are classified as intentional. Intentional wildfires are further subcategorized by 314  
“motivation,” i.e., as either agriculturally related (i.e., started by farmers to eliminate brush and 315  
agricultural debris) or non-agricultural. In our econometric estimates of the fixed effects, random 316  
effects, and zero-inflated negative binomial models, separate equations are reported for each 317  
motivation (m = agricultural, non-agricultural) as well as their sum, as mentioned. 318  
Population data were obtained from municipal administrative records. The population 319  
figure was divided by the area of the municipality (Pj,t), with daily changes computed by 320  
interpolation. As a proxy of income level (Gj,t), we used the change in the average income 321  
declared in annual income tax per year in the municipality, which was provided by the Spanish 322  
Tax Agency, and deflated with the annual average of the Consumer Price Index (IPC) by 323  
province (base year 2016); daily values were found by interpolation. The unemployment rate 324  
(Uj,t) was the change in the average 30-day centered average rate calculated from monthly 325  
municipality unemployment data, with daily changes computed by interpolation. Collected from 326  
the Public Employment Service, it was the seasonally adjusted number of unemployed persons 327  
aged 16 to 64, divided by the total population); daily values were found by interpolation. 328  
Holidays (Ht) were official days recognized across Spain and those official days 329  
recognized across Galicia only. Data on the meteorological variables for each municipality (Zj,t) 330  
were based on a network of weather stations distributed across Galicia; the center of each 331  
municipality was used as the reference location for computing distances to each weather station, 332  
and values were generated with an inverse-distance weighted spatial averaging process. 333  
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Daily data on the numbers of arrests, 𝐀!,!, are employed as daily sums of arrests made by 334  
the Guardia Civil (gendarmerie) and local police service.  Neighborhood arrest data, 𝐀!,! =335   𝐀!,!!!",𝐀!,!!"!",𝐀!,!!"!"  and their temporal lags were generated for three circular buffers around 336  
the centroid of the municipality. Centroid distance was determined using a 1:25,000 map of 337  
municipalities obtained from the Galician Territorial Information System. Note that buffers for 338  
municipalities on the edges of the region can extend into the Atlantic Ocean, where there are no 339  
arrests, and into Portugal and neighboring regions of Spain, where no consistent daily data are 340  
available on arrests. To avoid potential biases, the sample of municipalities used was limited to 341  
those that did not have a regional border with the rest of Spain or an international border with 342  
Portugal within the outermost ring of neighborhood arrests of the municipality. Municipalities 343  
with buffers that reached into the ocean were kept in the sample.  344  
Finally, elections variables are defined as representing the various phases of the election 345  
cycle of any of four possible levels: local (council), regional, national, or European 346  
parliamentary. Due to their individual infrequency, identification of the effects of the different 347  
levels of elections was usually not possible (likelihood maximization failed) if separately 348  
modeled, compelling their aggregation. 349  
In all models, we attempted to specify autoregressive orders as high as five, but it was 350  
clear upon estimation that high orders prevented many longer order autoregressive specifications 351  
from converging. Given the convergence problems, we limited our models to control for only 352  
first-order autocorrelation.  353  
The long lags of arrest data (back to t-545) effectively shortened the usable dataset by 1.5 354  
years, meaning that parameter estimates cover mid-2000 through December 2014. Effects are 355  
reported for the short-run, which ignores the autoregressive effect of wildfires within a 356  
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municipality, and the long-run, which incorporates the autoregressive effect. When estimating 357  
separate agricultural and non-agricultural intentional fire models, we included the lagged count 358  
and lagged zero count indicators (equation 5) of both categories. When calculating the long-run 359  
effects of elections and arrests, we used only the lagged count of the own type (i.e., the 360  
coefficient on agricultural intentional lagged fires was used to make the long-run adjustment, and 361  
the same for the non-agricultural category).  362  
Maximum likelihood estimation of some of the alternative specifications of the 363  
intentional fire count models failed when the sample of municipalities included those with fewer 364  
than 200 intentional wildfires, probably a result of lack of model parameter identification. To 365  
allow for greater comparability in model results and effect size estimates, models were estimated 366  
only for the 113 municipalities with at least 200 total intentional wildfires over the time span. 367  
Data sources and descriptions of variables included in models are shown in Table 1. 368  
 369  
Results 370  
Equation estimates 371  
Equation estimates for the fixed effects negative binomial models and the random effects 372  
negative binomial models are shown in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Estimates with alternative 373  
estimators are available from the authors. Summary estimation statistics indicate that the model 374  
specifications are significant compared to constant-only model estimates, as measured by the 375  
Wald Statistic, distributed Chi2(i). For total, agricultural, and non-agricultural fires, the random 376  
effects NB specification (allowing for differences in variances across municipalities) is preferred 377  
over a pooled NB specification with municipality-level heteroscedasticity, according to a Chi2 378  
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statistic and according to the significance of the dispersion parameters, which were all significant 379  
at α ≤ 0.01.  380  
Model estimates indicate that nearly all included variables are statistically significant at α 381  
≤ 0.01. Nearly all variables intended to account for suitable targets are highly statistically 382  
significant in all model estimates, including relative humidity, precipitation, wind speed, 383  
maximum daily temperature, the Keetch-Byram Drought Index, and the Fire Weather Index. 384  
Forest area, however, a measure of aggregate fuels available as ignition targets, is positively 385  
related to intentional fires, in total and then also for agricultural intentional wildfires, though not 386  
significant for non-agricultural intentional fires.  387  
Variables intended to account for temporal variations in the number of motivated 388  
offenders are typically also highly statistically significant in all models. Month indicators 389  
quantify a seasonal pattern in firesetting for both rural agricultural (possibly related to field 390  
preparation) and non-agricultural activities (possibly related to hunting), and they are nearly all 391  
highly statistically significantly different from the reference month of firesetting (December), 392  
with peak rates observed in February, March, and April, an ebb in June and July, more fires in 393  
August, and then somewhat more in autumn. In all model estimates, variables controlling for 394  
lower opportunity costs for carrying out firesetting at the daily time scale on non-work days, 395  
indicators of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, are statistically significant at α ≤ 0.01 and 396  
positively signed, as expected (e.g., Prestemon and Butry 2005; Prestemon et al. 2012). 397  
Population density generally is associated with more intentional firesetting, as expected (more 398  
motivated firesetters per unit area), in most of the model estimates. Unemployment, modeled as 399  
the change in rate, meant to capture how the opportunity cost of carrying out and getting caught 400  
setting intentional fires affects the number of motivated offenders, is usually not statistically 401  
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significant. The rate of change in real personal income, expected to be negatively related to the 402  
numbers of motivated offenders due to the higher opportunity costs of being caught intentionally 403  
igniting wildfires, demonstrates unexpected sign differences between intentional agricultural and 404  
non-agricultural firesetting. In the fixed effects NB specifications (Table 2), agricultural 405  
intentional fires respond negatively to income changes, as expected, while non-agricultural 406  
respond positively, counter to expectations (and also positively for total intentional fires). In the 407  
random effects NB specification (Table 3), agricultural fires have the expected negative sign on 408  
income changes, while not significant for non-agricultural fires and having an unexpectedly 409  
positive association with the total number of intentional fires. 410  
Variables intended to model spatial and temporal variations in capable guardianship are 411  
nearly all highly significant explainers of variation in intentional firesetting. Arrests at all lag 412  
orders evaluated are strongly statistically significant (α ≤ 0.01) and negatively signed. These 413  
results are found for within the municipality and at progressively greater spatiotemporal lags 414  
around the municipality, and they are found for both the fixed effects and random effects NB 415  
specifications. The negative signs on the spatiotemporal lags of arrests support a hypothesis that 416  
arrests do not simply displace intentional fires in space or time; rather, they work to decrease 417  
occurrence of such fires for long periods and across broad geographical areas near the arrests, 418  
presumably by increasing perceived capable guardianship both within the municipality and in 419  
surrounding municipalities.  420  
The modeled effects of elections, hypothesized to measure both the numbers of motivated 421  
offenders (because elections encourage political protest fires) and the numbers of capable 422  
guardians (shifting policing intensities), are consistently associated with intentional fire counts 423  
across all motivations and model specifications. Results reveal the temporal pattern of election-424  
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associated firesetting. First, election days either do not have greater numbers of intentional fires 425  
(agricultural in particular) or have fewer such fires (non-agricultural). Second, Silence Day has a 426  
pronounced higher rate of intentional firesetting for total, agricultural, and non-agricultural 427  
intentional fires. Third, campaign day periods have generally no effects or positive effects on 428  
intentional firesetting. For both the fixed effects NB (Table 2) and the random effects NB, higher 429  
firesetting rates are found in the 32 to 46 days and the 47 to 52 days prior to the election day but 430  
not in the month just prior to the election.  431  
Finally, we find that for total, agricultural, and non-agricultural intentional wildfires, 432  
intentional wildfires are positively first-order autocorrelated at the daily time step. Findings are 433  
similar for all model specifications, with all parameter estimates significant at α ≤ 0.01. For total 434  
intentional fires, the coefficient on the intentional fire count from day t-1, is 0.22 in both the 435  
fixed and random effects specifications. For agricultural intentional fires, the coefficient is 0.25 436  
on its own type in both specifications and 0.045 and 0.046 on the non-agricultural fire count day 437  
t-1 in the fixed effects and random effects NB specifications, respectively. For non-agricultural 438  
intentional fires, the coefficient is 0.21 on its own type and 0.12 on the agricultural fire count 439  
from day t-1, and the values are the same in both the fixed effects and random Effects NB 440  
specifications. In all specifications and fire types, coefficients controlling for zero fires in the 441  
previous day are negative, as expected, which shows that a count of zero fires in day t-1 leads to 442  
fewer intentional fires in day t.  443  
 444  
Effect size estimates 445  
Summary effects of elections and arrests on total, agricultural, and non-agricultural intentional 446  
wildfires are shown in Tables 4-6. The results are arranged according to the fixed effects NB, 447  
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random effects NB, and the four alternative estimators. The intentional wildfires in the 113 448  
municipalities analyzed, over the time span of our sample, represented about 77% of all 449  
intentional, 84% of all agricultural intentional, and 74% of all non-agricultural intentional fires 450  
that occurred in the municipalities whose 25 km arrest buffers did not cross into Portugal or the 451  
rest of Spain. If our equations were to be applied as well to the municipalities in Galicia meeting 452  
the buffer restrictions but having fewer than 200 intentional fires (1999-2014), the simulated 453  
changes in total fire counts would be larger and the percentage changes would be different than 454  
those shown in Tables 4-6. 455  
Effect sizes of arrests and of elections for the modeled 113 municipalities are statistically 456  
different from zero at α ≤ 0.01 in all specifications except for one alternative estimator, the 457  
Pooled ZINB with municipality indicators and municipality level heteroscedasticity for non-458  
agricultural intentional wildfires, for which election effect sizes are significant at α ≤ 0.05.  459  
Across all specifications and model versions, arrests are associated with a reduction in the 460  
counts of intentional wildfires in the municipality. Arrests in the previous 545 days prior to day t 461  
reduce wildfire occurrences in the municipality in day t. For the total of intentional wildfires 462  
(Table 4), the short-run elasticity of an arrest—i.e., the percent change in the number of 463  
intentional fires given a 1% increase in the number of arrests is -0.93 and -0.92 in the fixed 464  
effects and random effects NB specifications, respectively and ranges from -0.29 to -0.51 among 465  
the four alternative estimators. Long-run effects, which account for the autoregressive 466  
component in the intentional wildfire count process, are larger, at -1.20 and -1.18 for the fixed 467  
effects and random effects NB specifications, respectively, and range from -0.46 to -0.73 among 468  
the alternative estimators. For agricultural intentional fires (Table 5), the effects of arrests are 469  
substantially larger. Short-run effects are -1.68 and -1.67 and long-run effects are -2.25 and -2.24 470  
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in the fixed effects and random effects NB specifications, respectively. For the alternative 471  
estimators, short-run effects range from an elasticity of -0.24 to -0.43 and long-run effects -0.43 472  
to -0.66. Non-agricultural intentional fires are more inelastically related to arrests but still 473  
demonstrate more elastic responses to arrests when compared to agricultural intentional fires 474  
(Table 6). Arrest elasticities in the short-run range from -0.94 and -1.13 and in the long-run from 475  
-1.19 to -1.43 in the fixed effects and random effects NB specifications, respectively. Alternative 476  
estimators produce elasticity estimates from -0.32 to -0.54 in the short-run and -0.48 to -0.78 in 477  
the long run.   478  
Across all types of intentional fires and all specifications, the net effect of an election in 479  
Galicia is to increase the number of intentional wildfires. As shown in Tables 4-6, and as we did 480  
for arrests, we assessed the overall impacts of elections on firesetting in both the short-run and 481  
the long-run. Tables 4-6 report the simulated effects of setting all election indicator variables to 482  
zero and quantifying the simulated counterfactual of no elections during the duration of our 483  
estimation dataset (mid-2000 to December 2014).  484  
Consistent with the positive signs on many of the election indicator variables (Tables 2 485  
and 3), the effect of simulating no elections is to reduce the total number and also the number of 486  
agricultural and non-agricultural intentional wildfires. For the sum of agricultural and non-487  
agricultural models (Table 4), short-run effects are -1330 and -1328 in the short-run for the fixed 488  
effects and random effects NB specifications, and -1649 in the long-run for both specifications. 489  
Short-run effects among the alternative estimators range from -498 to -796 and long-run effects 490  
from -687 to -1240. In percentage terms, the simulated effect of not having elections would be to 491  
reduce the total number of intentional fires by -3.33% in the long-run according to the fixed 492  
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effects and random effects NB specifications, and from -1.35% to -2.44% among the alternative 493  
estimators.  494  
Effects of elections on agricultural fires (Table 5) are similar in magnitude but larger in 495  
percentage terms, compared to those quantified by the total intentional fire models. This finding 496  
indicates that aggregating both agricultural and non-agricultural intentional fires in a single 497  
model likely produces downwardly biased parameter estimates—i.e., aggregation bias. As shown 498  
in Table 5, both the fixed effects and random effects NB specifications produce nearly identical 499  
short- and long-run simulated reductions in the expected fires. In the long-run, the change in the 500  
number of intentional agricultural fires is about -1630, corresponding to -7.88%. Alternative 501  
estimators had long-run effects ranging from -327 to -623 and percent changes from -1.38 to -502  
2.14.  503  
For non-agricultural intentional fires, effects of simulated no-elections counterfactuals 504  
(Table 6) are also larger in percentage terms than found in the total intentional fire count changes 505  
(Table 4). For the fixed effects NB specification, the long-run effect is -1986, or -5.78%. For the 506  
random effects NB specification, the corresponding values are -934 and -2.79%. For the 507  
alternative estimators, the long-run effects range from -386 to -778, changes corresponding to -508  
1.12% to -2.25%.  509  
Combining the effects reported in Tables 5 and 6, we can quantify the total effect more 510  
accurately than by using the total intentional fire model effects shown in Table 4. For example, if 511  
we sum the fixed effects NB specification long-run effect of -1630 for the agricultural fires and -512  
1986 for the non-agricultural fires, we have -3616, a change of about -7.18% in the number of 513  
total intentional wildfires, calculated over mid-2000 through end-2014. For the random effects 514  
NB specifications in Tables 5 and 6, the summed effects are -2565 and -5.19%. These long-run 515  
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values can be compared to the corresponding values shown in Table 4, which are -1649 and -516  
3.33%, which are produced by both the fixed effects and random effects NB specification 517  
effects. 518  
 519  
Discussion and conclusions 520  
This study set out to evaluate whether arrests affect the spatiotemporal distribution of 521  
intentionally set future wildfires, which can provide insights regarding the overall effectiveness 522  
of law enforcement efforts. We used geographically and chronologically precise data on fire 523  
occurrence and arrests in Galicia to examine, based on the theoretical framework of RA theory 524  
(Cohen and Felson 1979), whether wildfire numbers changed locally and in nearby locations 525  
following intentional wildfire related arrests.  526  
Statistical model estimates indicate that variables connected to the three elements of RA 527  
theory were related to intentional firesetting, generally, in the ways expected. The numbers of 528  
motivated offenders were measured by population density, indicators of election periods, 529  
indicators of seasons when agricultural areas are being prepared for planting, and variables 530  
quantifying the opportunity costs of carrying out or potentially being arrested for intentional 531  
firesetting. The only motivated offenders variables that were not signed in the direction expected 532  
or significant in our empirical specifications were unemployment and income. For suitable 533  
targets, quantified by variables measuring aggregate fuels quantities (forest area) and amenable 534  
weather conditions (fire weather indices and several direct meteorological variables), the RA 535  
framing was supported by the signs and the significances of parameter estimates. Primary 536  
measures of the presence or absence of capable guardians were the temporal and spatiotemporal 537  
lags of recent arrests for intentional firesetting and election variables. Arrests were hypothesized 538  
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to communicate to motivated intentional firesetters that their likelihood of arrest, and hence 539  
capable guardianship, has increased. We found that all temporal and spatiotemporal lags of 540  
arrests were highly statistically significantly and negatively related to counts of intentional 541  
wildfires at all spatiotemporal lags tested, a finding expected given either perceived broad scale 542  
increases in capable guardianship or overall decreases in motivated offenders. Election variables 543  
were also generally statistically significantly related to intentional firesetting, adding additional 544  
weight to the usefulness of the RA-based theoretical framework for this crime process.  545  
Our study demonstrated that our hypotheses regarding potential spatiotemporal 546  
displacement of the effects of arrests and the effects of elections were robust to assumptions 547  
about the form of the wildfire data generation process. The fixed effects and random effects NB 548  
specifications generated broadly similar effect sizes and strong statistical significances. Although 549  
also strongly statistically significant and signed in the same way, estimates generated by 550  
arguably less well-fitting specifications, including the pooled NB models and the zero-inflated 551  
pooled NB models, produced effect sizes that were somewhat smaller.  552  
The separate estimation of agricultural and non-agricultural intentional fire models 553  
highlighted the importance of separately modeling intentional fires by motivation of the 554  
firesetter. One benefit of the disaggregation was to reveal that the effects of arrests and of 555  
elections were larger than when all motivations were combined and modeled together. Separate 556  
estimation produced summed total effect sizes of arrests and of elections that were more than 557  
twice as large as the effect sizes produced by models that combined them. In future research, 558  
analysts would be counseled to model intentional fires at as fine a level of motivational 559  
aggregation as can be supported by the data.  560  
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Another benefit of the separate modeling was to reveal the differences in the magnitudes 561  
of the effects of driving variables on intentional firesetting of different motivations. A 562  
comparison of the results reveals that agricultural fires are more elastically related to an arrest. 563  
The greater sensitivity of agricultural intentional firesetting to arrests could be considered in the 564  
context of the profit-maximizing behavior of an agriculturist, who decides when and whether to 565  
use fire as a land-clearing method, including in times when such fire use is forbidden. Because 566  
agriculturists depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, it makes sense that they would be 567  
particularly responsive to conditions under which their expected incomes would be reduced by 568  
criminal sanctions. The differential arrest sensitivity of these two classes of motivation also 569  
implies that attention to their relative prevalence in a landscape could be considered when 570  
making decisions on how to optimally deploy law enforcement resources across an agricultural-571  
wildland gradient: in agricultural intentional wildfire dominated landscapes, arrests would yield 572  
larger overall wildfire reductions than in places where non-agriculturally motivated firesetting 573  
predominates. 574  
Although law enforcement resource allocations are guided by a variety of tradeoff 575  
considerations, including attention to non-wildfire crimes and reducing fear of crime (Weisburd 576  
and Eck 2004), our results could aid policy makers in assessing the consequences of police 577  
resource tradeoffs. And while not explicitly designed to forecast future intentional wildfire 578  
locations in the form modeled by Prestemon et al. (2012), our results are potentially useful for 579  
implementing Problem Oriented Policing (e.g., Goldstein 1979; Weisburd et al. 2015) and 580  
intelligence-led policing (e.g., Ratcliffe 2016) strategies that focus on anticipating spatiotemporal 581  
crime concentrations and on identifying and incapacitating repeat offenders (e.g., serial 582  
arsonists). In the particular case of Galicia, by characterizing how wildfires are concentrated in 583  
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space-time and how the effects of arrests (and elections) alter such concentrations, our findings 584  
could help police organizations identify proactive steps to reducing intentional wildfire 585  
occurrences. 586  
Our results do not provide support for the existence of spatial displacement caused by one 587  
measure of law enforcement effort, the number of arrests (e.g., Eck 1993), a finding consistent 588  
with other research on the effects of stepped up policing (Bowers et al. 2011; Telep et al. 2014). 589  
Further study would be required to detect the effects of more distant (> 25 km) and longer-lasting 590  
(> 1.5 years) spatiotemporal lags of arrests.  591  
The arrest findings are possibly related to altered adjustments in perceptions of increased 592  
capable guardianship in response to local arrests. In Spain, fewer than 10% of intentional 593  
wildfire cases result in a conviction and sanction, a relatively low rate of clearance compared to 594  
other crime types, due to evidentiary difficulties (Fiscalía General del Estado Medio Ambiente y 595  
Urbanismo 2016). Furthermore, most convictions typically lead to fines, not imprisonment, the 596  
latter outcome primarily reserved for repeat offenders (e.g., González et al. 2017). Given the low 597  
probability of imprisonment for firesetting, we conclude that arrests primarily result in a 598  
perceived increase in capable guardianship rather than a reduction in motivated offenders. 599  
Although we could identify no published research on how arrests for intentional firesetting are 600  
communicated across a population of motivated firesetters, such as through traditional and social 601  
media, the precise mechanisms of information diffusion responsible for changes in perceived 602  
capable guardianship is an area worthy of additional study.  603  
 Our analyses also offer evidence that political activity is associated with increased overall 604  
rates of intentional firesetting. The signs and significances of the various election indicator 605  
variables highlight the potentially complex behavioral patterns among political protest actors in 606  
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Galicia. Furthermore, the identified temporal pattern of the effects of elections on intentional 607  
firesetting provides a roadmap for new strategies for allocating law enforcement resources during 608  
the election cycle. Four to seven weeks before an election, intentional firesetting is elevated. This 609  
is followed by a four-week window approaching Silence Day and Election Day of normal rates 610  
of firesetting, a Silence Day spike in intentional fires, and then low to normal rates on Election 611  
Day. The measured overall (net) effect of the entire election cycle, however, is to boost 612  
intentional firesetting. The fixed effects and random effects NB specifications implied that a no-613  
election counterfactual had up to 7% fewer agriculturally based intentional fires and 5% fewer 614  
non-agriculturally based intentional fires, with smaller impacts measured by the alternative 615  
estimators. Consistent with the conclusions of Kull (2002) and Skouras and Christodoulakis 616  
(2014), the larger agricultural effect of election cycles may occur because farmers perceive that 617  
capable guardianship is lower—i.e., the likelihood of being caught and sanctioned is lower—618  
during (the earlier phase of) campaigns, when law enforcement may direct more resources 619  
toward addressing spikes in other forms of social disruption. Likewise, election periods might 620  
increase the numbers of prospective offenders who are motivated to focus politicians’ and the 621  
media’s attention to ongoing public-government disagreements about how forests are managed 622  
(Hovardas 2014). Ramos and Sanz (2018) provide statistical evidence that large accidental 623  
wildfires may affect election outcomes favoring the incumbent party in municipal elections in 624  
Spain. If the conflict hypothesis is a partial explanation for the statistical evidence that our 625  
models provide, then policy makers could use our results to help evaluate the potential benefits 626  
of efforts to reduce such conflicts. 627  
 628  
 629  
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Table 1. Data sources and summary statistics of model variables for municipalities with at 820  
least 200 intentional wildfires, 1999-2014 821  
Variable Name Units Reporting 
frequency 
Min Max Mean Source 
Intentional 
wildfire 
ignitions 
count daily 0 16 0.0778 General Statistics of Forest Fires, 
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, and 
Fisheries, Food and Environment. 
Agricultural 
intentional 
wildfires 
count daily 0 10 0.0252 General Statistics of Forest Fires, 
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, and 
Fisheries, Food and Environment. 
Non-agricultural 
intentional 
wildfires 
count daily 0 12 0.0526 General Statistics of Forest Fires, 
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, and 
Fisheries, Food and Environment. 
Lightning 
ignitions 
count daily 0 4 0.0006 General Statistics of Forest Fires, 
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, and 
Fisheries, Food and Environment. 
Other ignitions count daily 0 6 0.0155 General Statistics of Forest Fires, 
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, and 
Fisheries, Food and Environment. 
Relative 
Humidity 
percent daily 18 100 59 Spanish Meteorological Agency 
(AEMet)  
Precipitation mm daily 0 265 4.24 Spanish Meteorological Agency 
(AEMet)  
Keetch-Byram 
Drought Index 
index 
number 
daily 0 702 83 Spanish Meteorological Agency 
(AEMet)  
Fire Weather 
Index 
index 
number 
daily 0.36 38.52 7.78 Spanish Meteorological Agency 
(AEMet)  
Average Daily 
Windspeed 
m/s daily 0.05 10.66 2.69 Spanish Meteorological Agency 
(AEMet)  
Average Daily 
Maximum 
Temperature 
degrees C daily -3.68 40.76 17.50 Spanish Meteorological Agency 
(AEMet)  
Arrests count daily 0 6 0.0010 Galician Guardia Civil  
Population less 
than 16 years 
persons annual 19 41707 2056 Galician Statistical Institute (Instituto 
Galego de Estatistica) 
Population less 
than 16 years 
Density  
persons/ ha annual 0.00
1 
8.163 0.262 Galician Statistical Institute (Instituto 
Galego de Estatistica) 
Land area ha  3236 37882 11508 Fourth Spanish Forest Inventory 
Average Income Thousand 
euros 
annual 4.35 29.59 11.31 Galician Statistical Institute (Instituto 
Galego de Estatistica) 
Unemployment 
rate 
percent monthly 1.00 16.40 5.84 Galician Statistical Institute (Instituto 
Galego de Estatistica) 
Forest Land 
Area 
ha   1050 23848 7500 Third Spanish Forest Inventory/Fourth 
Spanish Forest Inventory 
  822  
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Table 2. Fixed effects negative binomial model estimates for all intentional, agricultural 823  
intentional, and non-agricultural intentional wildfires in Galicia 824  
 
All  
Intentional 
Agricultural 
Intentional 
Non-Agricultural 
Intentional 
Relative humidity -0.58 *** -1.39 *** 0.028  
Precipitation -1.68 *** -1.72 *** -1.71 *** 
Keetch-Byram Drought Index 0.0033 *** 0.0033 *** 0.0028 *** 
Fire Weather Index 0.21 *** 0.16 *** 0.26 *** 
Wind Speed -0.65 *** -0.48 *** -0.80 *** 
Maximum Daily Temperature -0.021 *** -0.029 *** -0.017 *** 
January -0.20 *** -0.062  -0.288 *** 
February 0.93 *** 1.04 *** 0.83 *** 
March 1.11 *** 1.27 *** 1.00 *** 
April 0.79 *** 0.92 *** 0.65 *** 
May 0.20 *** 0.32 *** 0.061  
June 0.44 *** 0.50 *** 0.42 *** 
July 0.52 *** 0.47 *** 0.58 *** 
August 0.74 *** 0.81 *** 0.78 *** 
September 0.75 *** 0.83 *** 0.75 *** 
October 0.17 *** 0.38 *** 0.10 * 
November 0.07  0.12  0.045  
Arrests,t-1 to t-365 -0.016 *** -0.028 *** -0.0035  
Arrests,t-365 to t-545 -0.0092 *** -0.017 *** -0.0042 ** 
Neighbor 1 Arrests,t-1 to t-365 -0.013 *** -0.012 *** -0.0103 *** 
Neighbor 2 Arrests,t-1 to t-365 -0.022 *** -0.017 *** -0.021 *** 
Neighbor 3 Arrests,t-1 to t-365 -0.021 *** -0.019 *** -0.018 *** 
Neighbor 1 Arrests,t-365 to t-545 -0.008 *** -0.012 *** -0.0071 *** 
Neighbor 2 Arrests,t-365 to t-545 -0.0074 *** -0.007 *** -0.009 *** 
Neighbor 3 Arrests,t-365 to t-545 -0.011 *** -0.008 *** -0.012 *** 
Saturday 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 0.15 *** 
Sunday 0.22 *** 0.21 *** 0.21 *** 
Holiday 0.16 *** 0.11 *** 0.18 *** 
Campaign Day (2 to 16 Days Before) -0.019  -0.0034  0.0055  
Campaign Day (17 to 31 Days Before) 0.0036  0.0896 * 0.037  
Campaign Day (32 to 46 Days Before) 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.25 *** 
Campaign Day (47 to 52 Days Before) 0.074 *** 0.11 *** 0.08 *** 
Silence Day, t 0.57 *** 0.62 *** 0.55 *** 
Election Day, t -0.13  0.045  -0.253 * 
Population Density Change, all Persons, t 0.0017 *** 0.002 *** Not included 
Forest Area, t 0.0094 ** 0.038 *** -0.0039  
Unemployment Rate Change, t -0.082  4.34  2.01  
Real Total Personal Income Change, t 5.13 *** -4.32 ** 9.57 *** 
Intentional Fire Count,t-1 0.22 ***   
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All  
Intentional 
Agricultural 
Intentional 
Non-Agricultural 
Intentional 
No Intentional Fires,t-1 -1.15 ***   
Non-Ag Intentional Fire Count,t-1  0.045 *** 0.21 *** 
No Non-Ag Intentional Fires,t-1  -0.65 *** -1.22 *** 
Ag Intentional Fire Count,t-1  0.25 *** 0.12 *** 
No Ag Intentional Fires,t-1  -1.13 *** -0.57 *** 
Constant -0.67 *** -0.22  -0.72 *** 
Observations 576,074 576,074 617,319 
Model Significance (Wald Test) 59,074 *** 20,658 *** 45,263 *** 
*** indicates significantly different from zero at α ≤ 0.01, ** at α ≤ 0.05, * at α ≤ 0.10  825  
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Table 3. Random effects negative binomial model estimates for all intentional, agricultural 826  
intentional, and non-agricultural intentional wildfires in Galicia 827  
 
All  
Intentional 
Agricultural 
Intentional 
Non-Agricultural 
Intentional 
Relative humidity -0.58 *** -1.4 *** -0.26  
Precipitation -1.68 *** -1.72 *** -1.67 *** 
Keetch-Byram Drought Index 0.0033 *** 0.0033 *** 0.0034 *** 
Fire Weather Index 0.21 *** 0.16 *** 0.24 *** 
Wind Speed -0.65 *** -0.48 *** -0.73 *** 
Maximum Daily Temperature -0.022 *** -0.029 *** -0.019 *** 
January -0.20 *** -0.060  -0.27 *** 
February 0.93 *** 1.05 *** 0.85 *** 
March 1.11 *** 1.27 *** 0.98 *** 
April 0.79 *** 0.92 *** 0.68 *** 
May 0.21 *** 0.32 *** 0.080  
June 0.44 *** 0.5 *** 0.35 *** 
July 0.53 *** 0.48 *** 0.47 *** 
August 0.74 *** 0.82 *** 0.64 *** 
September 0.75 *** 0.84 *** 0.66 *** 
October 0.17 *** 0.38 *** 0.012  
November 0.067  0.12  0.0011  
Arrests,t-1 to t-365 -0.016 *** -0.028 *** -0.011 *** 
Arrests,t-365 to t-545 -0.009 *** -0.018 *** -0.007 *** 
Neighbor 1 Arrests,t-1 to t-365 -0.013 *** -0.012 *** -0.014 *** 
Neighbor 2 Arrests,t-1 to t-365 -0.022 *** -0.016 *** -0.025 *** 
Neighbor 3 Arrests,t-1 to t-365 -0.021 *** -0.019 *** -0.022 *** 
Neighbor 1 Arrests,t-365 to t-545 -0.008 *** -0.011 *** -0.0069 *** 
Neighbor 2 Arrests,t-365 to t-545 -0.007 *** -0.0068 *** -0.0081 *** 
Neighbor 3 Arrests,t-365 to t-545 -0.011 *** -0.0081 *** -0.013 *** 
Saturday 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 0.15 *** 
Sunday 0.22 *** 0.21 *** 0.23 *** 
Holiday 0.16 *** 0.11 *** 0.18 *** 
Campaign Day (2 to 16 Days Before) -0.019  -0.0035  -0.029  
Campaign Day (17 to 31 Days Before) 0.0038  0.090 * -0.044  
Campaign Day (32 to 46 Days Before) 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.14 *** 
Campaign Day (47 to 52 Days Before) 0.074 *** 0.11 *** 0.058 *** 
Silence Day, t 0.57 *** 0.62 *** 0.51 *** 
Election Day, t -0.14  0.045  -0.28 ** 
Population Density Change, all Persons, t 0.0016 *** 0.0020 *** 0.0015 *** 
Forest Area, t 0.0134 *** 0.040 *** 0.0024  
Unemployment Rate Change, t -0.12  4.304  -3.262  
Real Total Personal Income Change, t 5.17 *** -4.32 ** -0.26  
Intentional Fire Count,t-1 0.22 ***   
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All  
Intentional 
Agricultural 
Intentional 
Non-Agricultural 
Intentional 
No Intentional Fires,t-1 -1.16 ***   
Non-Ag Intentional Fire Count,t-1  0.046 *** 0.21 *** 
No Non-Ag Intentional Fires,t-1  -0.65 *** -1.18 *** 
Ag Intentional Fire Count,t-1  0.25 *** 0.12 *** 
No Ag Intentional Fires,t-1  -1.13 *** -0.54 *** 
Constant -0.69 *** -0.23  -0.54 *** 
Natural log of overdispersion parameter 
alpha (rho) 3.22 *** 2.30 *** 3.29 *** 
Natural log of overdispersion parameter 
alpha (sigma) 2.29 *** 0.60 *** 2.23 *** 
Observations 576,074 576,074 576,074 
Model Significance (Wald Test) 59,707 *** 20,713 *** 44,031 *** 
Likelihood Ratio Test vs. Pooled 4,285 *** 6,183 *** 2,606 *** 
*** indicates significantly different from zero at α ≤ 0.01, ** at α ≤ 0.05, * at α ≤ 0.10  828  
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Table 4. Effects of elections and arrests on all intentional wildfires in Galicia 829  
 
Modeled 
Number of 
Fires, if 
No 
Elections, 
Short-run 
Modeled 
Number of 
Fires, if 
No 
Elections, 
Long-run 
Percent 
change in 
Fires if No 
Elections, 
Short-run 
Percent 
change in 
fires, if No 
Elections, 
Long-run 
Elasticity of 
Intentional 
Fires with 
respect to 
Arrests, 
Short-run 
Elasticity of 
Intentional 
Fires with 
respect to 
Arrests, 
Long-run 
Fixed Effects NB -1330 *** -1649 *** -2.69 *** -3.33 *** -0.93 *** -1.20 *** 
Random Effects NB -1328 *** -1649 *** -2.68 *** -3.33 *** -0.92 *** -1.18 *** 
       
Alternative Estimators       
Pooled NB, Clustered Errors -749 *** -1135 *** -1.51 *** -2.29 *** -0.36 *** -0.60 *** 
Pooled NB, Municipality 
Indicators, Clustered Errors -665 *** -903 *** -1.34 *** -1.83 *** -0.51 *** -0.73 *** 
Pooled ZINB, Clustered 
Errors -796 *** -1240 *** -1.56 *** -2.44 *** -0.29 *** -0.46 *** 
Pooled ZINB, Municipality 
Indicators, Clustered Errors -498 *** -687 *** -0.98 *** -1.35 *** -0.41 *** -0.57 *** 
*** indicates significantly different from zero at α ≤ 0.01  830  
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Table 5. Effects of elections and arrests on agricultural intentional wildfires in Galicia 831  
 
Modeled 
Number of 
Fires, if 
No 
Elections, 
Short-run 
Modeled 
Number of 
Fires, if 
No 
Elections, 
Long-run 
Percent 
change in 
Fires if No 
Elections, 
Short-run 
Percent 
change in 
fires, if No 
Elections, 
Long-run 
Elasticity of 
Ag. 
Intentional 
Fires with 
respect to 
Arrests, 
Short-run 
Elasticity of 
Ag. 
Intentional 
Fires with 
respect to 
Arrests, 
Long-run 
Fixed Effects NB -1264 *** -1630 *** -7.88 *** -10.16 *** -1.68 *** -2.25 *** 
Random Effects NB -1263 *** -1631 *** -7.88 *** -10.17 *** -1.67 *** -2.24 *** 
       
Alternative Estimators       
Pooled NB, Clustered Errors -344 *** -594 *** -2.14 *** -3.70 *** -0.29 *** -0.57 *** 
Pooled NB, Municipality 
Indicators, Clustered Errors -306 *** -435 *** -1.91 *** -2.71 *** -0.43 *** -0.66 *** 
Pooled ZINB, Clustered 
Errors -342 *** -623 *** -2.05 *** -3.74 *** -0.24 *** -0.43 *** 
Pooled ZINB, Municipality 
Indicators, Clustered Errors -228 *** -327 *** -1.38 *** -1.99 *** -0.36 *** -0.52 *** 
*** indicates significantly different from zero at α ≤ 0.01  832  
  47  
  
Table 6. Effects of elections and arrests on non-agricultural intentional wildfires in Galicia 833  
 
Modeled 
Number of 
Fires, if 
No 
Elections, 
Short-run 
Modeled 
Number of 
Fires, if 
No 
Elections, 
Long-run 
Percent 
change in 
Fires if No 
Elections, 
Short-run 
Percent 
change in 
fires, if No 
Elections, 
Long-run 
Elasticity of 
Non-Ag. 
Intentional 
Fires with 
respect to 
Arrests, 
Short-run 
Elasticity of 
Non-Ag. 
Intentional 
Fires with 
respect to 
Arrests, 
Long-run 
Fixed Effects NB -1625 *** -1986 *** -4.73 *** -5.78 *** -0.94 *** -1.19 *** 
Random Effects NB -768 *** -934 *** -2.30 *** -2.79 *** -1.13 *** -1.43 *** 
       
Alternative Estimators       
Pooled NB, Clustered Errors -428 *** -619 *** -1.28 *** -1.85 *** -0.39 *** -0.62 *** 
Pooled NB, Municipality 
Indicators, Clustered Errors -362 *** -486 *** -1.08 *** -1.45 *** -0.54 *** -0.78 *** 
Pooled ZINB, Clustered 
Errors -513 *** -778 *** -1.48 *** -2.25 *** -0.32 *** -0.48 *** 
Pooled ZINB, Municipality 
Indicators, Clustered Errors -278 ** -386 ** -0.80 ** -1.12 ** -0.44 *** -0.60 *** 
*** indicates significantly different from zero at α ≤ 0.01, ** at α ≤ 0.05 834  
